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ABSTRACT
Decentralized blockchain-based cryptocurrencies like Ethereum and Bitcoin
offer a new way to hold and transact money. However, storage requirements
for every node and difficulty in transaction confirmation make them difficult
to match traditional payment processors. A proposed solution to scalability
is the use of payment channels that allow mutually distrustful parties to
create and authorize payments between one another off-line. Not only does
this allow payments to be processed quickly, but it also reduces transaction
volume in the underlying blockchain.
An unsolved problem with off-chain payment channels is that participants
in the channel must be on-line and alert to channel events all the time. If
any participant in the channel goes off-line for any reason (power outage,
process crashes, cost too high) that party stands to lose money if other
parties attempt to reverse payments. In an ideal world, a solution would
involve a third party that can process payments on behalf of each party, but
it requires trust establishment.
In this work, we present a protocol that solves the monitoring problem
called Pisa. Pisa allows channel participants to appoint distrusted third par-
ties to watch their channel and handle finalization on their behalf without
revealing any linkable state information. We also propose a fair exchange
protocol that ensures that payment for appointment of a third party guar-
antees a penalty if the third party cheats. Further, we implement Pisa on
top of an existing Ethereum payment channel framework, µ-Raiden, and we
demonstrate its additional overhead to channel operation.
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To Satoshi, for always being Craig Wright.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Decentralized cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum have risen to promi-
nence in recent years due to the promise of their underlying technology: the
blockchain. At a high level, the blockchain is a consensus protocol where
nodes in the network compete to finalize and order transactions in a con-
sistent and tamper-resistant public ledger [1]. The protocol rewards users
for taking part in the computationally intensive leader election with newly
minted coins and transaction fees. All transactions that are finalized by the
leader are replicated and verified by every node in the network.
Although this form of network-wide replication provides stronger security
guarantees for finalized transactions, it is a significant bottleneck for transac-
tion throughput. With rising transaction volumes, the requirements to store
and verify computation for every transaction may shrink the number of nodes
actually capable of performing the task. To prevent requirements exceeding
the available resources in the network, this trade-off has resulted in cryp-
tocurrencies with low throughput compared to modern payment processors.
For example, Visa, at peak capacity, can handle up to 47,000 transaction per
second [2] (real usage hovers around 4,000 tps, even at peak usage). When
compared to Bitcoin’s 7 transactions per second [3, 4] it is clear that decen-
tralized blockchains are still very far away from handling modern transaction
requirements. Many solutions have been proposed which radically redesign
the blockchain consensus mechanisms [5, 6, 7].
This trade-off has also been a point of contention in the cryptocurrency
community [3, 8]. Some proposed solutions from one side want to increase
the block size allowing more transactions to be finalized per block, but they
sacrifice the requirements of nodes to store and verify larger blocks. Bitcoin
has stagnated, in this respect, with few layer 1 changes1 aimed at increasing
transaction throughput. Ethereum, however, has a higher network through-
1Layer 1 protocols deal directly with the functioning of the blockchain.
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put, but at the cost of the inability of some peers to verify transactions in
real-time. For example, fast sync modes were introduced for those nodes
unable to process all transactions in real-time. This has led many to turn to
layer 2 solutions.2
This thesis focuses on the scaling approach of off-chain payment channels in
which mutually distrusting parties can authorize payments among themselves
by locally executing the state transitions of a payment smart contract. In a
payment channel, the blockchain is no longer used to validate and authorize
payments, but, instead, it is used only to open and close payment channels
[9, 10]. They are very promising scalability solutions as they can easily
be implemented on top of existing blockchains like Ethereum and Bitcoin,
and there are actually companies putting considerable effort behind building
them [11, 9, 12]. One such company, Raiden, is trying to launch an Ethereum
payment channel network and recently launched µ-Raiden [13], a lite version
of Raiden that implements one-way payment channels for paywalled content.
The drawback of payment channels, though, is that channel participants are
required to always be on-line and alert to counter-parties trying to finalize
their channels on an expired state. When off-line, finalization of an older
state is tantamount to an irreversible theft of money.
A proposed solution to this problem is for participants to appoint a third
party to intervene on their behalf when a channel is being finalized. As of
today, this idea has been discussed in its application to Raiden and Bitcoin’s
Lightning Network [9] (LN), however, only LN has created proposals for a
monitoring protocol. The proposal in LN requires the third party to store the
hash of every previous state so that the channel can settle on the most recent
state and expired states can be revoked if published. This approach has a few
drawbacks: the design of LN requires the monitor’s storage per channel to
scale linearly with the number of payments, the monitor is only compensated
if the final state is disputed, and inactivity by the monitor is not penalized.
Ethereum’s main payment channel proposal, Raiden, currently does not have
any solution to the monitoring problem.
This work presents a new protocol for third-party monitoring of payment
channels in Ethereum called Pisa. The protocol allows channel participants
to appoint one or more monitors every time a new state is authorized. Pisa
2Layer 2 solutions do not modify the blockchain architecture but only interact with it.
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also ensures that monitors do not stay on-line and use storage just to watch
a channel whose final state is never disputed by paying them in a one-way
payment channel every time a new state is outsourced. Furthermore, only
the hash of the most recent authorized state is provided to the monitor to
preserve the privacy of the channel and ensure a constant storage requirement
per channel. Finally, monitors and their customers exchange payments for
receipts that can be used to penalize the monitor for not correctly responding
to channel finalization.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 introduces the key concepts critical in understanding the blockchain’s
consensus mechanism and the cost of on-chain transactions. It also introduces
payment channels at a more detailed level, setting up the rest of the thesis’
discussion of Pisa.
• Chapter 3 describes the monitoring protocol at a high level in the context of
generalized payments channels. In this chapter the specifics of the monitor’s
contract are described along with the protocol between the monitor and cus-
tomer that facilitates fair exchange and the penalties for incorrect behavior.
• Chapter 4 describes an implementation of Pisa in µ-Raiden, a uni-directional
payment channel framework currently deployed in Ethereum. The additional
costs involved in running Pisa are presented and compared with µ-Raiden.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
This chapter explains the necessary background information needed to un-
derstand the remainder of this work. Section 2.1 begins by explaining the
blockchain, the mechanisms that provide security and the concept of pseudony-
mous accounts. It goes on to explain how transactions are created, validated
and update the state of the blockchain. Finally, Section 2.2 describes gener-
alized payment channels and their impact on scalability in cryptocurrencies.
2.1 The Blockchain
A blockchain is a distributed network that maintains a globally consistent
log of transactions (Figure 2.1). The transactions are created by accounts on
the network and modify the blockchain’s global state. Peers in the network
compete to win rounds of a leader election protocol and finalize transactions
by adding them to the current blockchain. In the scope of cryptocurrencies,
the leaders that are elected are called miners. In each round, miners com-
pete to complete a heavy computational task for election as leader of that
round. Once elected, the miner finalizes transactions by collating them into
a block and appending the block onto the current blockchain. The new block
references the previous block and incorporates its hash into the computation
work that was performed. Not only does a large computation act as a deter-
rent to creating blocks that violate the rules of the network, but it makes it
difficult to revert transactions in old blocks as they are linked to every sub-
sequent block–requiring all subsequent blocks to be changed. All nodes in
the network then validate the block and append it to their local copy of the
blockchain. Although expensive, replication of the blockchain on all nodes
ensures that a malicious majority is needed in order to subvert the rules on
consensus. The changes made by the new transactions are applied and the
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states of the relevant accounts are updated, hence updating the global state
of the blockchain. The remainder of this section will focus on the blockchain
as it is implemented in Ethereum.
Accounts. There are two types of accounts in Ethereum: externally owned
accounts and contract accounts. Externally owned accounts are controlled
by ECDSA private keys. Contract accounts are controlled by the contract
code that is associated with them. Externally owned accounts do not have
associated code, and can send messages to any other account by creating
and signing a transaction. Contract accounts, on the other hand, will only
execute their code when triggered to do so by a incoming message. The
triggered code is then allowed to read and write from its persistent storage,
create new messages or even new contracts (but never transactions).
Transactions. Transactions are signed data packets that store a message
that is sent from an external account to any other account on the network.
A transactions contains:
1. The recipient of the message.
2. A signature by the sender.
3. The amount of Ether being transferred.
4. Optional, arbitrary data.
5. A GASLIMIT value that limits the maximum number of computational
steps allowed by execution of the transaction.
6. A GASPRICE value that specifies the amount of Ether to be payed per
computational unit used during execution.
The first few fields enable currency transfers and are common to all cryp-
tocurrencies. The data field is optional but serves a special purpose in
Ethereum. When a transaction sends a message to an external account,
the data field does not serve a default purpose; it can be any arbitrary data
the sender wishes to include. When a transaction sends a message to a con-
tract account, the data field is read by the contract and used to determine
what code to execute. Specifically, the data field is parsed to determine the
function being called and its input arguments.
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Figure 2.1: Representation of a blockchain showing the transactions in a
block and the contents of the transaction.
The last two fields have to do with a new feature in Ethereum called gas.
At a high level gas is used to limit the execution of smart contract code when
it is triggered and its state changes are finalized. Limiting the units of gas
allowed in a particular transaction’s execution ensures that nodes verifying
them have a hard upper bound on the amount of computation they need to
do. The gas price is used to compensate miners for the work expended in
executing a contract and including it in the next block. Blocks also enforce a
limit on the total amount of computation allowed in all transactions within
them.
Although gas is an effective method for ensuring nodes are not consumed by
large computations, it also makes block space a valuable and costly resource.
As a consequence, block space is very limited and transactions must fight to
be included in a block as soon as possible. Transactions that pay a higher
gas price to miners will obviously be preferred and confirmed more quickly.
This poses a big problem for scalability as it can drive transaction fees up as
more users, and more transactions, enter the network. Similarly, scalability
faces further price increases with recent proposals to commoditize resources
on the Ethereum network like transaction relaying.
Clearly, with larger adoption and more transactions, Ethereum fees may
increase to a point where small value transfers may not be reasonable any-
more. This is especially true for the purchase of cheap physical goods made in
person, where small value transfers need to be confirmed quickly. Therefore,
off-chain payment solutions solve this problem by allowing arbitrarily small
payment to be made to another user without requiring frequent interaction
with the blockchain.
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1 event ExampleLog(string _arbitrary_data);
2
3 function foo() {
4 ExampleLog("This is event will be logged.");
5 }
Figure 2.2: When the function foo is executed an ExampleLog event is
created. The event can relay arbitrary information about the execution to
any party watching this contract for events.
The final feature of Ethereum that is relevant to this work is events. In
Ethereum, a smart contract can generate logs be emitting events that are
recorded in the blockchain. An event can be invoked at any time during
contract execution and include any arbitrary data. An example of an event is
shown in Figure 2.2. When an event is created by a contract, it is recorded in
the same block as the transaction that generated it and can be easily queried
for with Ethereum clients. A common practice in developing applications
with a smart contract back-end is to use events external inputs like a user
depositing money. For example a payment channel can use events to indicate
when users deposit funds and being an off-line channel.
2.2 Payment Channels
The protocol described in this work relies on a construction of payment
channels based on the generalized state channels described by Miller et al.
[14]. The construction allows an arbitrary number of parties, p1, ..., pn to
authorize and send payments between themselves without the need to publish
transactions to the blockchain. The only blockchain interaction required is
to create channels and settle their final state.
A payment channel is defined by its participants, their current balances,
a state flag, and a monotonically increasing state counter. A state flag is
always one of three values: {⊥, OK, DISPUTE}. In order, they represent an
uninitialized channel, a channel operating off-chain, and a channel handling
a settlement of its final state on-chain. Despite potential confusion, the set-
tlement stage is referred to by the DISPUTE flag because any participant can
dispute the proposed final state during this time. The timers and variables
associated with this period all have the “settle” subscript to indicated that the
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channel is settled after this stage.
2.2.1 Channel Creation
To initialize a channel, the contract creator must specify the amount of time,
δsettle, after a dispute is raised, that the participants have to challenge the
latest proposed final state. Participants indicate agreement with the param-
eter by giving the contract some initial amount of Ether and a signature.
Once all participants have provided a signature and an Ether deposit, the
channel’s state flag moves from ⊥ to OK, the state counter initializes to 0, and
all participants begin handling payments off-chain. u The initial deposits are
recorded on-chain and comprise the first state of the channel. All subsequent
off-chain state updates must build on top of it. In the rest of this section,
the “state” of the channel is defined as the most recent authorizes set of
participants’ balances.
2.2.2 Payments
After initialization of the channel, the initial state of the channel is just the
deposit of each of the participants. From there, the integrity of the channel
relies on the participants collectively signing new states and revoking the
old ones, creating arbitrary payments between them. The state counter is
ascribed to every new state to ensure a global agreement on the chronology
of all previous states from S1 to an arbitrary Si.
A payment from one participant to another can be initiated by any party.
Figure 2.3 demonstrates a participant, Mike, proposing a payment from him-
self to Bob. To propose a new state Mike must first define what the updated
balances of the new state will look like. Then to propose the new state S ′i+1
he creates a signature:
σM = SignMike(S
′
i′ , i
′) (2.1)
and sends it to Alice, Sarah and Bob. Each of them verifies that Mike has
a sufficient balance to pay Bob 1 coin, checks the validity of his signature
and asserts that i′ = i + 1. If the proposed payment is accepted, they agree
to it by creating a similar signature with their keys and broadcasting it to
everyone else. The proposal is committed as the new state when every party
8
Figure 2.3: Mike proposes a new state to the other participants indicating
that he wants to pay Bob 1 coin. The participants may choose to reject it,
but they approve it by signing off on it. Once all participants sign it, it
becomes the new state of the channel.
receives and verifies the signatures from everyone else. The flexibility of this
generalized payment channel also allows Mike to propose an update where
by he debits Bob’s accounts and pays himself. One can imagine a case where
Mike is able to automate payments from Bob’s account in return for some
good or service.
When a participant initiates a new state, a local timeout is initialized to
wait for responses from the rest of the channel. If no new state authoriza-
tion is seen by the initiator within the local timeout, the protocol resorts to
settling on-chain so that his money is no longer locked in a channel where
his payments are not being authorized.
2.2.3 Settlement
Any party can attempt to stop the payment channel and settle its final
balance on the blockchain. The first step in finalizing a payment channel
is calling the setstate (Figure 2.4) contract function with the last channel
state, the new state counter, and the channel participants’ signatures. In the
example in Figure 2.3, if Alice wants to finalize the channel she must submit:
Si, i, σAlice, σSarah, σMike, σBob (2.2)
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function setstate((state′, i), σP):
discard if i ≤ stateRound
if Sig.Verify(P , (state′, i′, this.ID),ΣP)
set stateRound := i′
set state := state′
EventEvidence(stateRound, state)
Figure 2.4: Pseudo-code for the setstate function in a payment channel.
Only more recent states with a larger counter than the current stateRound
will be accepted. The state and counter value must also be signed by all
channel participants. The signature also include the address of the payment
channel contract, this.ID, for replay protection.
where σk = Signk(Si, i). This allows the contract to verify that Si was au-
thorized by all parties before accepting it. The second step is for Alice to
call triggerdispute (Figure 2.5) which initiates a settlement period.
When the settlement period is initiated, the channel’s state flag transitions
from OK to DISPUTE and it establishes a deadline tsettle := CurTime()+δsettle.
Each party is notified by the contract of the triggered settlement period and
the computed tsettle deadline before which any participant can dispute the
final state of the channel. If the state Si submitted by the settlement initiator
is not the latest authorized state in the channel, then finalization of that state
will mean that somebody will not get the coins they have previously been
paid. Once finalized, the state of the channel can no longer be changed,
so participants need to be active in detecting and responding to settlement
attempts on expired states.
In order to dispute the proposed final state, any participant may provide
the contract with a different state Si′ , i
′ and the corresponding signatures
from all participants. The contract will assert that any new state being
submitted has a counter such that i′ = i+ 1. This ensures that the contract
will only accept states newer than the ones already committed by others.
If the contract can validate that the new state, Si′ , was authorized by all
participants, it then becomes the new temporary final state. Disputes can
be raised indefinitely until the tsettle has passed at which point the latest state
to be submitted is considered final. Once the settlement period has ended
and the final state of the channel is determined, any participant may call
resolve (Figure 2.6) to claim their final balance of coins.
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function triggerdispute(statei, ri, σk):
discard if flag 6= OK
discard if state 6= ε
set flag := DISPUTE
set tstart := CurTime()
set tsettle := tstart + ∆settle
EventDispute(tsettle)
Figure 2.5: Once a state is set, this function begins the process of closing
the channel. All participants are notified of the dispute and can respond
with their newest state by calling setstate.
function resolve():
discard if CurTime() ≤ tsettle
if flag = DISPUTE
set flag := OK
send state balances to P
EventResolve(stateRound)
Figure 2.6: Resolve function called after the dispute period ends. Sends
each participant his or her final balance encoded in state.
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CHAPTER 3
PROTOCOL
Off-chain payment channels presented in Section 2.2 greatly reduce the cost
of paying individuals using cryptocurrencies by removing the need to finalize
every payment on the blockchain. Not only does this reduce the fees paid per
payment, but it also reduces transaction bloat in the underlying blockchain
network. This means the network can support more users, making many
small-valued payments to each other without substantial increase in block
space demand. There is a downside to this approach, however, that has lead
to a lack of adoption or deployment of such systems in the wild. Payment
channels require participants to always be on-line and active in the channel.
This means being alert and responding to channel closes/disputes when other
participants publish old authorized states. A user, though, can go off-line for
extended periods of time for a variety of reasons: power outages, computer
failures, connectivity issues, etc. Therefore, a party that is at risk of going
off-line stands to lose money by using a payment channel. At least with on-
chain transactions, there is no need to stay on-line once they are created as
the rules of the network will ensure they are correctly executed and published.
Example. Assume Alice and Bob open a payment channel with each other
where either of them can craft payments to each other. The channel starts
with a deposit of $10 from each of them. Over the course of multiple rounds,
both propose state updates which pay the other party some amount of money.
When Bob’s process crashes and is no longer active in the channel, Alice is
also unable to advance the state further–effectively locking her money in the
channel indefinitely. Therefore, Alice will attempt to close the channel and
reclaim the remainder of her funds. If she notices that Bob is not on-line, she
can submit an older state to the chain and reverse some of her payments. If
Bob does not come back on-line before the settlement deadline has passed,
Alice has successfully settled the channel in a state where she has taken some
of Bob’s money.
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In an ideal world, a solution to this problem would be an intermediary that
processes all off-line payment on their behalf. This third party would always
be on-line and watch the state to ensure it closes correctly. This section
outlines a protocol called Pisa, that allows channel participants to appoint
third parties to monitor channels on their behalf to relax their liveness re-
quirements.
3.1 Overview
Pisa enables participants in the payment channel to appoint one or more
monitors to watch their channel for disputes. Participants interact with the
monitor’s contract which implements a one-way channel with a large deposit,
cM , and additional functionality to watch other channels. A customer com-
municates with the monitor and passes along the hash of the current state
and a payment for every new appointment.
Any participant in the channel can appoint a monitor to respond with
evidence in the case of settlement. The appointment of a monitor, however,
is for a single state only. If the monitor is appointed for the current state,
Si, it acts correctly only if it submits evidence of the state Si. Therefore,
participants who want continuous monitoring of their channel must appoint
a monitor for every new authorized state. To appoint a monitor, a customer
provides the monitor with the hash of the current state, H(Si, ri),
1 the round
number i, signatures, σP such that
σi = Sign(H(Si, ri), i) (3.1)
and payment for watching the channel. In return, the monitor gives the
customer a signed receipt for the appointment specifying the round being
watched and the period of the appointment. The receipt serves as proof that
the customer can provide in the future to penalize the monitor for not acting
correctly during channel settlement.
When a channel close is requested, the monitor can act in one of two ways.
The monitor can respond with the latest hashed state that it was appointed
for along with the correct signatures. If it does responds with the latest
1ri is a random blinding factor that makes discovering pre-images more difficult.
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appointed state, no other party will be able to finalize an older state. This
ensures the channel closes at least in the customer’s latest outsourced state.
The monitor can choose to collude with the other participants in the channel
by not submitting the correct state during a dispute. An older state may
favor the other participants of the channel, and a bribe can be paid to the
monitor to act maliciously. However, a customer can come back on-line and
submit the monitor’s signed receipt as proof of appointment and claim its
large deposit.
The amount of the monitor’s deposit is crucial to the security of the pro-
tocol. Customers should only appoint monitors whose large deposit is large
enough such that the other participants could not pay the monitor enough
from an older state to make it profitable for the monitor to cheat.
3.2 Goals
This section presents the goals of Pisa such that the privacy of every inter-
mediate channel state Si is not revealed to the monitor and that fairness is
preserved for both customer and monitor.
3.2.1 State Privacy
In Pisa the monitor should not learn anything about the actual state of the
channel at any time except finalization. The monitor receives only the hash
of the current authorized state, H(Si, ri). Although the payments themselves
are hidden, the necessity of revealing the state’s round number does not hide
when the payments were made.
3.2.2 Fairness
When a monitor accepts an appointment for a particular state in a channel,
it is always paid for it by the customer. The monitor also provides a receipt
to the customer indicating the terms of the appointment and its duration.
However, Pisa must ensure that neither party can cheat in the exchange of
payment for receipt. This requires Pisa to accomplish two goals:
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• Fair Exchange In the generalized case, a fair exchange is a protocol where
two mutually distributing parties can exchange digital goods in a way that
guarantees: both parties receive the other good or neither of them do. When
a customer and a monitor are exchanging a receipt for a payment, Pisa must
ensure that the two goods are exchanged fairly. This ensures that the monitor
cannot accept payments without providing evidence of the appointment, and
that the customer cannot obtain a valid receipt without paying for it.
• Non-frameability When the monitor has acted correctly, a customer should
not be able to provide a receipt to frame the monitor for wrongdoing.
3.2.3 Monitor Cost
An ideal protocol for third-party monitoring minimizes the storage require-
ments for the monitor. Therefore, a goal of Pisa is to limit the monitor’s
resource requirement to be O(1). Pisa should also ensure that the moni-
tor is rewarded for storage updates for every new appointment. To further
reduce the operating cost, all payments between the customer and monitor
are handled by an off-chain uni-directional payment channel; this ensures a
continuous revenue stream for the monitor.
3.3 Assumptions
This section outlines the assumption made by the protocol on the capabilities
and behavior of the channel participants, the customer and the monitor.
3.3.1 Channel Participants
The participants of this channel are assumed to act rationally. Each par-
ticipant’s decision strategy will choose the action that gives that party the
greatest final balance in the payment channel. In a payment channel, each
party will always attempt to finalize the channel on a state that gives that
party the highest payoff, even if it is not the latest one. In the simpler case of
uni-directional payment channels the receiver of the payments will necessar-
ily publish the latest agreed upon state as it will always pay that participant
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the most. Naturally, the client will always prefer to finalize on an earlier
state.
The channel participants are assumed not to collude with the monitor in
order to reveal the pre-image of any state. If participants reveal the state, the
monitor can eavesdrop on the channel with ease. However, the participants
may collude with the monitor to settle their channel on an older state. If
the other participants can profit from paying the monitor more than the
monitor’s large deposit, they will always attempt to do so. Finally, it is
assumed that any party that is off-line for more than the length of a dispute
settlement period will have appointed at least one monitor to respond to
disputes.
3.3.2 Customer and Monitor
Any channel participant that appoints a monitor to watch a channel is called
a customer of that monitor. Customers are also rational and will try to
maximize their payoff in their protocol with the monitor. This means that, if
possible, the customer will always try to reverse the payments to the monitor
or craft evidence against the monitor if feasible.
The monitor is assumed to be a rational and curious actor. Rationality
implies monitors will watch a channel appointed to them only if they have
been appropriately paid to store state information and will correctly respond
to closures if they cannot profit from cheating. For example, if the channel
participants offer bribes greater than the monitor’s contract deposit then the
monitor will choose to collude with them to the close channel in an incorrect
state. Curiosity implies that the monitor will attempt to extract the state
information from information provided by the customer if computationally
feasible.
3.3.3 Contracts
Pisa does not take into account edge cases on the blockchain where the out-
come of contract execution may be reverted or altered due to hard forks,
transaction reorganization, or any other blockchain failures. Therefore, con-
tracts are assumed to be honest third parties with immutable code that al-
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ways executes correctly. For the monitor contract, specifically, it is assumed
that the contract can look up disputes in the channel that it is watching and
extract the relevant information.
3.4 Payment Channel Modifications
This section focuses on the changes made to the generalized payment channel
contract in Section 2.2. The new payment channel supports participants
authorizing the hash of state, H(Si, ri), instead of just Si.
The first modification to the payment channel construction supports re-
porting the authorized state hash of the current state through the setstate
function (Figure 3.1). To preserve the state’s privacy on-chain, each partici-
pant exchanges signatures for H(Si, ri) where ri is a blinding nonce. Without
the nonce, it would be computationally feasible for the monitor to brute force
the pre-image of the state since the starting balances of each party are known
at channel creation time. The round number, in this case, is not hidden so
that the contract is able to order the hashed states it sees and only accept
more recent rounds. Furthermore, the state, Si, and the nonce, ri, are only
revealed to the monitor when the channel is being finalized and the final
state must be revealed for the contract to pay out to its participants.
function setstate((hstate, i), σP):
Discard if flag 6= DISPUTE
discard if i ≤ stateRound
if Sig.Verify(P , (hstate, i), σP)
set stateRound := i
set hstate := hstate
EventEvidence(stateRound, hstate)
Figure 3.1: Modified setstate function that accepts the blinded hash of the
current state instead of the state itself.
3.5 Monitor Contract
This section provides an overview of the monitor contract which allows cus-
tomers to appoint the monitor for a specific state. It implements a one-way
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Monitor contract
flag := ⊥
ID,monitor := ∅
∆settle,∆withdraw, twithdraw := 0
deposit, profit := 0
function setup(M, deposit, σM,∆withdraw,∆settle,):
if Sig.Verify(M, deposit, σM)
set M := M, deposit := deposit
set ∆withdraw := ∆withdraw, ∆settle := ∆settle, flag := OK
EventSetup()
function deposit(Pk, cdeposit, Sig):
discard if flag 6= OK
discard if ID[].flag = DISPUTE
if Sig.Verify(, cdeposit, σPk)
if ID[].flag = CLOSED
set ID[].flag := OK
set ID[].deposit += cdeposit
EventDeposit(, cdeposit)
Figure 3.2: This first part of the monitor contract is where the contract
parameters are set up by the monitor. It also specified a deposit to which
a customer can deposit coins to be used in the payment channel. A
customer must deposit coins before the monitor can be appointed to watch
any channel.
payment channel for the customer to pay the monitor per appointment, and
it also allows the customer to forfeit the monitor’s deposit if it acts incor-
rectly. In the following, each part of the monitor contract is accompanied by
a snippet of pseudo-code.
The monitor’s contract has four state flags: {⊥, OKAY, CHEATED, CLOSED}.
The contract state starts in state ⊥ to indicate that it is uninitialized. Once
the monitor has submitted a large deposit, cM , to the contract and sets
∆settle,∆withdraw using the setup function (Figure 3.2), the contract transi-
tions from ⊥→ OK. Customers can now open payment channels with the
monitor by depositing money through the deposit function.
Monitor’s Payment Channel. The monitor contract stores a list of all
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of the payment channels that customers have opened, indexed by unique
identifiers. A customer’s payment channel can be in one of four flag states:
⊥, OK, DISPUTE, CLOSED. In order to transition a channel from ⊥→ OK, or
from CLOSED → OK the customer must deposit money into the channel via
the deposit function (Figure 3.2). As this is a one-way payment channel,
the monitor can choose to unilaterally close any channel it has open at any
time. The contract does not allow a settlement period in this case as the
monitor will always submit the most recent authorized state. The customer
can request a payment channel be closed as well, but will always have to
wait until the monitor is given enough time to dispute the final state of the
channel.
Fair Exchange. Once the channel is open, the customer can pay the mon-
itor for every new hashed state, H(Si, ri), it wants the monitor to publish
on its behalf. In return for the payment and the hashed state, the monitor
creates and signs a receipt as proof of appointment. The receipt and payment
are exchanged using the fair exchange protocol illustrated in Figure 3.3.
To initiate the fair exchange, the customer sends the current state hash,
the current round number, the amount of the payment (c) and an expire
time (texpire). The customer must also sign all of these parameters as well
as the channel participants’ signatures on the state hash. The monitor can
check the state hash that is sent along with the signatures and round number.
If satisfied with the payment and the validity of the signatures, the monitor
issues a receipt to the customer containing the state hash, round number, the
length of the appointment (CurTime() + ∆settle), and a conditional transfer
hash hi. In order for the receipt to be ratified, the monitor must reveal the
pre-image of hi, si as it needs to be provided for the customer to request
recourse in the future. The customer creates a signed conditional transfer
that pays the monitor if the pre-image of hi is revealed. The monitor can
choose to reveal the pre-image to the customer off-line once it receives the
conditional payment. If the monitor does not reveal the pre-image to the
customer, the customer raises a dispute through the triggerdispute function
(Figure 3.4), moving the contract flag from OK to DISPUTE. To claim the
conditional payment, the monitor can reveal the pre-image by forcing an
on-chain update to the channel by called setstate. Calling this function
completes the conditional payment and sets a dispute settlement period,
but it also reveals the pre-image of hi–validating the customer’s receipt. Of
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Participant Monitor MonitorCon
σPk ← Sign(skPk , c)
deposit(Pk, c, σk)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ EventDeposit(Pk, c)
(hstatei, i, chan), σP , c, texpire−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b← VerifyAppointment(σP , chan,i,hstatei, c, texpire)
if b=0 return 0
si ← R, hi ← H(si)
tstart ← CurTime(), texpire ← tstart + ∆settle
σM ← Sign(skM, (tstart, texpire, chan, hi)
receipt← (σM, tstart, texpire, chan, i, hi)
receipt←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
b← VerifyReceipt(receipt)
if b=0 return 0
σPk ← Sign(skPk , (receipt.hi, c, ID))
pay← (σPk , receipt.hi, c)
pay−−−−−−−−−−→
b← VerifyPayment(pay, receipt.c, receipt.hi)
if b=0 return 0
In the rest of this figure: We present three protocol outcomes which occur depending on the Monitor’s response.
Outcome 1: Monitor accepts payment within a timely manner
si←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
b← hstatei = H(si)
if b=0 return 0
Outcome 2: Monitor does not reveal si privately to the Participant, but redeems on-chain
LocalTimeout()
σPk ← Sign(skPk , close)
triggerdispute(Pk, σPk)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ EventDispute(tsettle)
σM ← Sign(skM, pay)
setstate(pay, si, σPk , σM)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ EventEvidence(Pk, pay)
Outcome 3: Monitor does not reveal si privately to Participant and the Monitor does not redeem the conditional transfer
LocalTimeout()
σPk ← Sign(skPk , close)
triggerdispute(Pk, σPk)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ EventDispute(tsettle)
Wait(CurTime() + ∆settle)
resolve(Pk)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ EventResolve(Pk)
Figure 3.3: A fair exchange protocol that ensures the monitor is paid upon
validating the customer’s receipt. If the monitor redeems the conditional
payment in any way, the pre-image is always revealed and the receipt
always becomes valid.
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Monitor contract (continued)
function setstate(state, si, Sig.σM):
discard if flag = CHEATED
discard if state.k 6= ID[Pk].k
discard if state.payout > ID[Pk].deposit
if state.conditional transfer = TRUE
discard if state.hash 6= H(si).
if Sig.Verify(monitor, state, σmonitor)
∧ Sig.Verify(, state, σsender)
set profit += state.payout
send ID[Pk].deposit− state.payout coins to sender
set ID[] := [0, 0,CLOSED, ID[sender].k + 1]
EventEvidence(, statei)
function triggerdispute(, σPk):
if ID[].flag = OK ∧ Sig.Verify(sender, close, σsender)
set ID[].flag := DISPUTE
set ID[].tsettle := CurTime() + ∆settle
EventDispute(, ID[sender].tsettle)
function resolve(Pk):
if flag = CHEATED ∨
(ID[Pk].tsettle ≤ CurTime() ∧ ID[Pk].flag = DISPUTE)
send ID[].deposit coins to C
set ID[] := [0, 0,CLOSED, ID[Pk].k + 1]
EventResolve()
Figure 3.4: This part of the monitor contract implements the payment
channel functionality like the generalized payment channels in Section 2.2.
The setstate function here differs slightly to force the monitor to reveal
the pre-image from a conditional transfer. resolve allows the customer to
forfeit the monitor’s deposit.
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course, the monitor can also choose not to claim the payment and let the
settlement period expire. After expiration the customer can call resolve to
retrieve his deposit and close the channel.
The fair exchange protocol specified shows that for all the cases where
the monitor accepts the conditional payment from the customer, the receipt
that was provided becomes valid. There is no way for the monitor to be
paid for a new appointment without creating a valid receipt. Similarly, once
the conditional payment is signed and sent to the monitor, the customer has
already obtained a signed receipt and cannot reverse the payment if it is
redeemed by the monitor. Hence, the exchange is only valid if both parties
get what they want: a receipt for a payment. Otherwise, neither is valid.
Recourse. If the monitor gets paid during the fair exchange, the pre-
image of hi is always revealed and the receipt validated. When a customer’s
channel triggers a dispute within the period of the appointment, the monitor
is obligated to respond with the correct hashed state. If the monitor does not
respond, the customer can submit the signed receipt along with the pre-image
of the conditional payment to the recourse (Figure 3.5) function to forfeit
the monitor’s deposit. When recourse is called, the monitor’s contract
checks the closing state and closing time of the outsourced channel against
the receipt to determine whether the monitor acted correctly. If not, the
monitor’s deposit is forfeited and the contract state transitions to CHEATED.
At this point the customer can call resolve to claim its remaining deposit
and close the channel.
Closing the Channel. Finally, the monitor can also stop monitoring and
prevent new customers from starting new channels. If the contract is in the
OK state, the monitor can call stopmonitoring (Figure 3.5) which tran-
sitions the contract from OK → CLOSED. A withdrawal period is also set
(twithdraw = CurTime() + ∆withdraw), after which the monitor can reclaim the
contract deposit, cM . Despite being closed, however, the monitor is still ob-
ligated to respect outstanding customers’ valid receipts. An important note
on this protocol is that the appointment period, texpire, should always be less
than twithdraw. Otherwise, the monitor can reclaim the deposit, cM , before a
customer’s receipt expires. The monitor would no longer have to respect the
receipt as there is no deposit to forfeit. Prudence is required on the part of
the customer to ensure that the monitor is not paid for a receipt that will
allow this to happen.
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Monitor contract (continued)
function stopmonitoring(σM):
if Sig.Verify(M, stop, σM)
set flag := CLOSED
set twithdraw := CurTime() + ∆withdraw
EventClose(twithdraw)
function withdraw(σM):
discard if flag = CHEATED
if Sig.Verify(M,withdraw, σM)
if ID.length = 0 ∧ CurTime() > twithdraw ∧ flag = CLOSED
set profit += deposit, deposit := 0
send profit to M
set profit := 0
EventWithdraw()
function recourse(receipt, si, σM):
discard if flag = CHEATED
discard if receipt.hi 6= H(si)
set chan := lookup(receipt.chan)
if Sig.Verify(M, receipt, σM)
for k in chan.disputes.length
if chan.disputes[k].start > signedreceipt.start
∧ signedreceipt.expire > chan.disputes[k].end
∧ signedreceipt.i ≥ chan.disputes[k].stateRound
set flag := CHEATED
EventForfeit()
Figure 3.5: This final part of the monitor contract, allows the customer to
take action against a monitor by submitting the receipt received during fair
exchange. The stopmonitoring allows the monitor to unilaterally close
the channel because it will always close on the latest state.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLEMENTATION
In this work, we implemented Pisa as an add-on to an existing payment
channel system called µ-Raiden [13]. Although there exist other payment
channel systems such as the Lightning Network [9] or Raiden [11], µ-Raiden
remains the only one that has been deployed on the Ethereum main network
at the time this work began. This chapter starts by providing background
on how µ-Raiden works out-of-the box. Next, the modifications made to
the existing channel management contract and the new monitor contract
implementation are described (the actual smart contract code can be found
in Figure A.1). The final section describes the overhead incurred by the
added fault tolerance provided by Pisa.
4.1 Background on µ-Raiden
This section describes how µ-Raiden implements a payment channel and the
different steps involved in local state authorization and on-chain settlement.
The next section builds off this background to describe the modifications
required to implement Pisa.
µ-Raiden implements an off-chain payment channel framework that facili-
tates frequent micropayments of ERC20 [15] tokens between clients and ser-
vice providers. Some of the use cases for this framework include pay-per-use
services where automatic microtransactions act as a replacement for obtru-
sive advertising and subscription walls [13]. For this reason, it only supports
uni-directional payment channels where many clients open channels with one
server.
Basic Deployment. A server wanting to accept micropayments first needs
to create and deploy a special ERC20 token contract through which channel
deposits are made. The server also deploys a contract to manage its payment
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channels called RaidenMicroTransferChannels. This contract stores a list
of the server’s open channels and notifies it when on-chain channel events
occur. The server continuously listens for contract events or http connections
to begin accepting payments and serving content.
4.1.1 Channel Creation
Before requesting paywalled content, the customer must first obtain the un-
derlying token that the channel manager contract uses. In the default setting,
the server requires a client to spend at least 100 finney1 to mint 50 tokens for
itself. A client requesting an “expensive”2 resource creates a GET request to
the server for the endpoint it wants. If a channel with the server does not al-
ready exist, it notifies the client to initialize a channel by transferring tokens
to the contract’s address. This triggers the channel contracts token fallback
procedure which then calls createChannel. Both the server and client wait
until a confirmed ChannelCreated event is detected before proceeding with
off-chain payments.
When the channel is created, the contract creates a unique identifying key
for the channel:
1 // Create unique identifier from sender , receiver and current
block number
2 bytes32 key = getKey(_sender_address , _receiver_address ,
open_block_number);
The contract indexes the channels data with key and stores the channel
creation block and the initial deposit. When the ChannelCreated event is
detected by the server, it creates a local copy of the channel in its database
and responds to the client’s GET request indicating that it is ready to accept
an off-chain payment.
4.1.2 Making a Payment
To pay the server for a resource the client creates an update to the current
state called a balance message proof. The balance message proof encodes the
details of the channel such as the sender address, receiver address and open
11 finney = 0.001 Ether.
2Expensive means that the resource requires a micropayment to access it.
25
1 bytes32 balance_message_hash = keccak256(
2 keccak256(
3 ’string message_id ’,
4 ’address receiver ’,
5 ’uint32 block_created ’,
6 ’uint192 balance ’,
7 ’address contract ’
8 ),
9 keccak256(
10 ’Sender balance proof signature ’,
11 _receiver_address ,
12 _open_block_number ,
13 _balance ,
14 _address(this)
15 )
16 );
Figure 4.1: Solidity code used to re-create the keccak256 hash of the
balance message with the receiver address, the creation block number, the
newest balance of the channel and the address of the channel manager
contract.
block number. Additionally, for every new state the message also encodes
the new balance of the channel. The balance message proof is created by
the client with the balance field incremented by the value of the payment.
The client signs the message and sends it to the server for verification. The
precise encoding of the balance message is shown in Figure 4.1.
The implementation deviates from the generalized protocol described in
Chapter 3 omitted the state counter. This is because the payment channels
in µ-Raiden are uni-directional. Therefore, the balance field in the state is a
monotonically increasing value, and is treated as a proxy for the state counter.
For example, when settled on-chain, the contract can always distinguish the
chronology of two states by looking at their balances. Another consequence
of this kind of channel is that the server will always close the channel with
the latest balance message that pays it the most. So, the contract allows the
server to unilaterally close a payment channel at any time with the latest
state.
If the server accepts the balance message, it responds to the client with
the resource that it requested. If the message is not valid for any reason,
the server will notify the client to try again. For example, the server can
notify the client of lacking token funds to back the payment and to resolve
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it before attempting another payment. The channel can proceed in this way
indefinitely until either party attempts to close the channel and settle the
final balance on-chain.
4.1.3 Settling On-Chain
At some point in the life of a µ-Raiden payment channel, one of the par-
ties will attempt to close the channel and withdraw its own funds. If the
server requests the channel be closed, the contract fast tracks the request
and immediately closes the channel as mentioned in Section 4.1.2. When
a client finishes its session with the server, it can do one of two things: 1.
it can leave the existing channel open for reuse at a later time, 2. it can
attempt to close the channel and claim its funds. In the former case, the
client simply disconnects from the server, and the server maintains the chan-
nels in its database. In the latter case, the client submits a close request
through the uncooperativeClose function. The function allows the client
to specify any desired balance to close on even if it is not the correct final
balance. Hence, it can do so without submitting a signed balance message.
The contract then creates and stores a closing request for the channel in
question and creates a settlement period in which the server can respond
with a newer state: tsettle = CurTime() + ∆settle. Finally, the contract emits a
ChannelCloseRequested event which identifies the channel, the settlement
timeout and the requested closing balance.
A requested closing balance less than the actual latest balance will prompt
the server to submit proof of a larger balance. As mentioned before, the server
can unilaterally settle channels. Therefore, the server calls cooperativeClose
(the function is show in Figure 4.2) with the latest balance message signed
by the client along with a closing signature. The closing signature is a signed
message from the server that indicates an intent to close the channel. If the
balance message is signed by the client and the closing message is signed by
the receiver, the contract accepts them and settles the channel. The contract
then deletes the channel and closing request and tranfers the appropriate
amount of tokens to each party’s account.
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1 function cooperativeClose(
2 address _receiver_address ,
3 uint32 _open_block_number ,
4 uint192 _balance ,
5 bytes _balance_msg_sig ,
6 bytes _closing_sig)
7 external
8 {
9 // Derive sender address from signed balance proof
10 address sender = extractBalanceProofSignature(
11 _receiver_address ,
12 _open_block_number ,
13 _balance ,
14 _balance_msg_sig
15 );
16
17 // Derive receiver address from closing signature
18 address receiver = extractClosingSignature(
19 sender ,
20 _open_block_number ,
21 _balance ,
22 _closing_sig
23 );
24 require(receiver == _receiver_address);
25
26 // Both signatures have been verified and the channel
can be settled.
27 settleChannel(sender , receiver , _open_block_number ,
_balance);
28 }
Figure 4.2: Sample code of the cooperative close mechanism in µ-Raiden.
The closing request and balance message are checked for correct
signatures before the channel is settled, i.e. correct balances are transferred
to each party and the channel is deleted.
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4.2 Modifications
The main goal of the Pisa is to provide fault tolerance for a specific payment
channel failure mode without incurring substantial overhead cost Pisa de-
ployment. Hence, the modifications made to µ-Raiden are minimal, and the
on-chain costs incurred by Pisa are compared to the loss incurred by failure.
This section outlines the changes and new features added to µ-Raiden in
order to implement the protocol described in Chapter 3. The implementation
reflect the capabilities of the monitor to interact with the server’s contract
and submit evidence for the channels that it is watching. It also implements
a new time period in which the monitors of a channel can submit their evi-
dence. Finally, the monitor’s contract is created to facilitate a uni-directional
channel between customers and the monitor, and allow customers to request
recourse if the monitor misbehaves.
For the remainder of this section, the protocol will refer to the monitor’s
smart contract code (Figure A.1) and other snippets from the code.
Changes to µ-Raiden Contract. The first change made to the channel
contract is the addition of a new timer for monitor submission. When a
channel close is requested instead of a single tsettle deadline, two deadlines
are created:
tmonitor = CurTime() + ∆monitor (4.1)
tsettle = tmonitor + ∆settle (4.2)
The first deadline is only relevant to the server in that it has to wait until
the deadline has passed to proceed with closing the channel. The contract
also provides a mechanism for the monitor to submit evidence when a channel
close (Figure 4.3) is requested and for his contract to request channel closing
information. In all three of these modifications there is no overhead cost
incurred by a server deploying Pisa in both normal operation and in the case
of failure as they are only relevant to the monitor.
Monitor Contract The monitor contract closely resembles the pseudo-code
algorithm described in Section 3.5. A copy of the actual smart contract is
shown in Listing A.1 in Appendix A, and will be referred to often in the rest
of the chapter.
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1 function monitorEvidence(
2 address receiver , uint32 open_block_number ,
3 bytes32 balance_msg_hash , bytes balance_msg_sig)
4 external view
5 {
6 // ’s’ is correct iff it produces a valid channel key
7 address s = ECVerify.ecverify(balance_msg_hash ,
balance_msg_sig);
8 bytes32 key = getKey(s, receiver , open_block_number);
9
10 // Make sure this channel and its closing_request exist
11 require(channels[key]. open_block_number > 0);
12 require(closing_requests[key]. settle_block_number > 0);
13
14 // Make sure the monitor responds when he is allowed to
15 require(closing_requests[key]. monitor_block_number >
block.number);
16
17 // Set the monitor ’s submitted evidence
18 closing_requests[key]. evidence = balance_msg_hash;
19 closing_requests[key]. evidence_sig = balance_msg_sig;
20
21 emit MonitorInterference(s, open_block_number ,
balance_msg_sig);
22 }
Figure 4.3: The monitorEvidence function that records the monitor’s
submitted state hash.
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4.3 Modifications to µ-Raiden Off-Chain
Client-Server Communication. The client-server communication remains
largely unchanged as Pisa is mainly concerned with the customer-monitor
communication. The first step in implementing the monitoring protocol is
establishing a seed for the blinding terms used in the state hashes. How-
ever, for the purposes of this implementation, a secret sharing scheme was
not implemented, but there exist protocols that facilitate public randomness
generation between a group of people [16]. The client and server in this case
are assumed to have already agreed upon a seed beforehand that will be
used for the duration of the channel. Since the purpose of the implemen-
tation is to demonstrate overhead cost, the actual randomness used in the
implementation is irrelevent as long as it does not affect the on-chain cost.
Server-Monitor Communication. Unlike communication between the server
and client, the server-monitor communication is handled by Python’s multi-
processing module. This module implements a high-level API for handling
sockets. The monitor deploys a listener that constantly listens for new socket
connections from a customer. The server, on the other hand, only attempts
to connect to the monitor once. From then on, only the monitor is triggered
by server messages and never vice versa.
4.4 Customer and Monitor Setup
When the server starts up, it first establishes a connection with the monitor.
The monitor sends its contract’s address and its own Ethereum address so the
potential customer can verify its parameters. Figure 4.4 shows the customer’s
communication with the monitor and its contract before the connection is
finalized. This step requires prudence on the part of the customer to assure
that the settlement and withdrawal timers are set such that the monitor can
not claim the deposit until all disputes are settled.
The remainder of the implementation exactly follows the protocol proposed
in Chapter 3. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter compares the gas and
storage costs of Pisa during channel faults and during misbehavior by the
monitor.
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Customer Monitor MonitorCon
START CONNECTION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Monitor address←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Contract address←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
b = ∆withdraw >> ∆settle ∆settle,∆withdraw←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Outcome 1: b = 0
REJECT−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
END CONNECTION
Outcome 2: b = 1
contract.deposit(c)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ EventDeposit(sender, c)
CONNECTION FINALIZED
Figure 4.4: The initial communication between the monitor and potential
customer. The customer rejects this monitor contract if its parameters are
not suitable.
4.5 Cost of Pisa
It is important that the cost of implementing Pisa on top of the uni-directional
channel framework does not dissuade participants from using it. Not only will
it impact deployment of Pisa, but transaction costs might influence parties in
the protocol to deviate from the specification. It is important to measure the
on-chain costs in different scenarios and ensure the failure conditions do not
significantly impact the participants. Unless otherwise specified, the costs
represented by Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 are in units of Ether. When a dollar
amount is presented, it is based on the exchange rate of $402.35 per Ether
as reported by EtherScan on Tuesday April 3, 2018 [17]. All operations de-
scribed below including contract delpoyment take place on the Rinkeby test
network.
Contract Deployment. The first cost incurred by the server is the deploy-
ment of its contracts augmented with the modifications described in Sec-
tion 4.2. The RaidenMicroTransferChannels contract was augmented with
functionality for the monitor to submit hashed states, and for the monitor’s
contract to extract closing information for recourse. The exact cost of de-
ploying the contract is shown in Table 4.1. This cost is incurred once as
the server will deploy and operate only one copy of this contract. For this
reason, the small increase in deployment cost is not very important as cost
per-channel with many clients will quickly dominate it.
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The monitor’s cost in deploying his contract in Table 4.1 is a little more
than one-third the cost of the server’s contract even though they both support
uni-directional channels. This large difference in the cost can be explained
by two facts. First, the server’s contract allows for senders to create one-way
channels to any address. This means that the same contract can be used by
many different server operators. Therefore, in order to access a particular
channel the contract needs to index the list of channels with the hash of the
sender, receiver and open block number of the channel. Furthermore, the
ability to have multiple channels open from the same sender increases the
complexity of balance and closing proofs that the contract must verify.
Client-Server In µ-Raiden, the client-server protocol is modified the least.
Described in Section 4.2, it is only modified to support blinded nonces in the
balance message proofs. The balance message encoding in Figure 4.1 now
includes the blinded nonce as part of the message hash. This additional,
but marginal, cost is incurred by the server when it closes a channel by
submitting the client’s balance proof. The additional work in including the
blinded nonce is reflected in the row corresponding to cooperativeClose in
Table 4.2. However, the nonce accounts for only a small part of the difference
in cost. The other comes into play during channel settlement.
Monitor Equivocates The fair exchange of the receipt for the customer’s
payment is critical to ensuring the fairness property described in Section 3.2.
In the case where none of the parties in the protocol equivocate, the fair
exchange of the monitor’s receipt for the customer’s conditional payment
only incurs payment for appointment. All additional steps required by Pisa
are performed off-line for every new state that is outsourced.
The customer, however, incurs additional overhead if the monitor equivo-
cates and does not reveal the pre-image during the exchange. If the monitor
tries to close the channel by not revealing the pre-image, the customer must
create an on-chain transaction, calling triggerDispute, attempting to close
the channel with the monitor. However, despite the small cost in trigger-
ing a dispute (Table 4.3 function triggerDispute), failure in fair exchange
can still complete a new appointment if the monitor responds to the dispute
by calling setstate and redeeming the latest conditional payment on-chain.
This reveals the pre-image and makes the latest signed receipt valid. If the
monitor does not redeems the payment, the customer resolves the channel
once its settlement period had passed. The customer may choose not to re-
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solve the channel as the remaining funds are less than the cost of retrieving
them. Therefore, at worst, the customer can expect to lose the cost of one
transaction in closing the channel with the monitor. Examining the gas cost
in Table 4.3, even in the case of monitor equivocation the gas cost of channel
resolution is very low while monitor appointment and subsequent recourse is
still guaranteed. Furthermore, the added cost of closing a payment channel is
not a deterrent to its use, as evidenced by actual payment channel adoption
and usage.
Client Settlement Up to this point, the overhead cost to the customer has
been discussed in the context of isolated protocol failures in Pisa. This sec-
tion describes the overhead in the failure condition that Pisa is designed to
protect against: an off-line party being cheated by the counter-party. When
the server goes off-line for any period of time, it is assumed that at least
one monitor was assigned to watch the channel on the server’s behalf. This
means that prior to going off-line, the server engaged in one or more fair
exchanges to outsource the latest state of the channel to a monitor. In the
worst case, as described in the previous paragraph, the monitor equivocates
and the fair exchange is completed on-chain–yielding minimal overhead to
the server. Once off-line, the customer suffers no additional on-chain penal-
ties in closing the channel as the monitor disputes incorrect channel closes
on the server’s behalf, and the client calls uncooperativeClose with any
desired balance. The contract emits a ChannelCloseRequested event with
the appropriate deadline and closing balance information for monitors and
channel participants. The monitor responds by submitting the latest hashed
state as evidence to the channel such that the channel closes on the latest
hashed state given by the customer. After the state closes and the customer
comes back on-line, the customer only needs to settle his payment channel
to reclaim his funds and send the remainder to the client. If the monitor
cheats and does not adhere to the signed receipt, then the customer can call
recourse in the monitor’s contract. Recourse is a particularly expensive
computation as it invokes another contract and verifies a signature, however,
the larger cost (Table 4.3 row “recourse”) is compensated for by the large
deposit the customer claims from the monitor’s contract.
It is evident from the discussion of the overhead cost of Pisa that in the
best case where no parties equivocate, the customer’s only added cost comes
from creating a channel with the monitor and paying for the appointments.
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Table 4.1: A comparison of the cost involved in deploying the contracts for
µ-Raiden and for Pisa. The price represented here is 1 Ether = $402.36
[17]. There is only a marginal increase in the cost of deployment.
µ-Raiden Pisa
Contract Server Server Monitor
CustomToken 0.00326 0.00326 -
RaidenMicroTransferChannels 0.00770 0.00890 -
MonitorContract - - 0.00468
Ether 0.01096 0.01216 0.00468
Cost $4.4099 $4.8927 $1.8830
Table 4.2: The gas costs involved in Pisa when no parties deviate from the
protocol. The monitor reveals the pre-image on-line so no interaction with
the monitor contract is required.
µ-Raiden Pisa
Phase Server Client Server Monitor Client
Channel Creation
deposit - - 0.00135 - -
createChannel - 0.00178 - - 0.00178
Fair Exchange
triggerDispute - - Pre-image is
setstate - - revealed off-line.
Uncoop Close
uncooperativeClose - 0.00107 - - 0.00120
cooperativeClose 0.00112 - 0.00123 - -
Monitor Evidence monitorEvidence - - - 0.00355 -
Total 0.00112 0.00285 0.00258 0.00355 0.00289
This overhead is advantageous as the customer is safeguarding a large channel
balance from the client attempting the cheat. The amount that is paid is
left to an agreement between the customer and monitor where the customer
will only agree on a price that minimized his expected loss from channel
disputes. In the worse case, the fair exchange between customer and monitor
fails, and the customer must settle his channel with the monitor through an
on-chain transaction. This added overhead, however, still guarantees that the
customer’s channel will at least close on a state that was paid to outsource.
Even upon failure of the monitor, all of the customer’s described overhead
costs are compensated for by the monitor’s forfeited deposit.
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Table 4.3: The first subtotal represents the case where the monitor does not
reveal the pre-image in the conditional payment off-line, but does attempt
to redeem the payment on-chain. This makes the signed receipt valid for
recourse. The second subtotal replaces the fair exchange in the first one
with the case where the monitor does not reveal the pre-image, and does
not redeem the payment on-chain. The final row shows the cost to the
customer of requesting recourse from the monitor’s contract. The recourse
costs are not calculated into a sub total.
Phase Pisa
Server Monitor Client
Channel Creation
deposit 0.00135 - -
createChannel - - 0.00178
Fair Exchange
triggerDipsute 0.00105 - -
setstate - 0.00131 -
Uncoop Close
uncooperativeClose - - 0.00120
cooperativeClose 0.00123 - -
Monitor Evidence monitorEvidence - 0.00355 -
Sub Total 0.00363 0.00486 0.00289
Fair Exchange triggerDispute 0.00105 - -
No Payment resolve 0.00083 - -
Sub Total 0.00446 0.00355 0.00289
Monitor Cheats
recourse 0.00131 - -
resolve 0.00083 - -
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Decentralized cryptocurrencies currently face large hurdles in scaling their
transaction throughput to match modern payment processors. Payment
channels are a promising solution that off-loads the work of creating, au-
thorizing and validating payments between individuals to a local protocol
that is executed off-chain by channel participants. Raiden is an experimental
proposal for payment channels and payment channel networks on Ethereum,
however, it does not have any solution to the liveness requirement of channel
participants. The construction of Pisa presented in this thesis removes the
requirement by allowing users to appoint third parties to monitor payment
channels on their behalf while preserving the privacy of every intermediate
state and ensuring a constant storage requirement. Third parties store the
hash of the most recent outsourced state and respond to channel closes re-
quests with the most recent state on behalf of their customers. Futhermore,
under the assumption of rational and curious actors, the protocol also intro-
duces a novel fair exchange protocol where customers receive signed receipts
of appointment which guarantee compensation in case of a cheating monitor.
The practicality of the protocol is also demonstrated by our implementa-
tion of Pisa in µ-Raiden, a framework for unidirectional payment channels.
The implementation demonstrates the minimal changes that are required to
deploy Pisa and the little added on-chain cost to the customer. In the worst-
case scenario where a monitor equivocates during the outsouring protocol,
the added cost to the customer is only two on-chain transactions that handle
closing of a payment channel. Even under equivocation, however, the fair
exchange protocol guarantees that monitor’s are still obligated to respond
to according to any previously exchanged receipt and that the customer is
guarantees compensation by the monitor’s large deposit. Pisa solves a fun-
damental problem with current payment channels in ethereum and its con-
struction and implementation in this thesis demonstrates its strong fairness
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guarantees and low operating cost.
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APPENDIX A
MONITOR’S SMART CONTRACT
Listing A.1: This is the monitor’s smart contract written on Solidity. It
manages all payment channels to customers and can check for customer
recourse.
1 contract StateGuardian {
2 event CustomerDeposit(
3 address indexed _sender_address ,
4 uint indexed _sender_deposit
5 );
6 event Dispute(
7 address indexed _customer_address ,
8 uint32 indexed _open_block_number ,
9 address indexed _sender_address ,
10 uint32 _channel_settle
11 );
12 event Resolve(
13 address indexed _sender_address
14 );
15 event Evidence(
16 address indexed _customer_address ,
17 address indexed _sender_address ,
18 uint32 indexed _pre_image ,
19 uint32 _open_block_number
20 );
21 event Close(
22 uint32 _t_withdraw
23 );
24 event Withdraw ();
25 event RecourseResult(
26 bytes32 indexed _evidence ,
27 bytes32 _receipt_hash ,
28 bool indexed _cheated
29 );
30
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31 enum Flags { OK , DISPUTE , CLOSED , CHEATED }
32
33 struct channel {
34 uint deposit;
35 uint32 t_settle;
36 Flags flag;
37 uint payout;
38 RaidenMicroTransferChannels caddr;
39 }
40
41 Flags flag;
42 uint public profit;
43 uint32 public delta_settle;
44 uint32 public delta_withdraw;
45 uint32 t_withdraw;
46 uint public num_customers;
47 uint public guardian_deposit;
48 address public monitor = msg.sender;
49
50 mapping (address => channel) public ID;
51
52 function setup(uint32 _delta_withdraw , uint32
_delta_settle)
53 payable external
54 {
55 require(msg.sender == monitor);
56 guardian_deposit = msg.value;
57 delta_settle = _delta_settle;
58 delta_withdraw = _delta_withdraw;
59 t_withdraw = 0;
60 flag = Flags.OK;
61 }
62 function deposit(address caddr)
63 payable external
64 {
65 require(msg.value > 0);
66 require(flag == Flags.OK);
67 require(ID[msg.sender ].flag != Flags.DISPUTE);
68
69 if (ID[msg.sender ].flag == Flags.CLOSED) {
70 num_customers += 1;
71 ID[msg.sender ].flag = Flags.OK;
72 }
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73 ID[msg.sender ]. deposit += msg.value;
74 ID[msg.sender ]. caddr = RaidenMicroTransferChannels(
caddr);
75 num_customers += 1;
76 CustomerDeposit(msg.sender , msg.value);
77 }
78 function extract_state_signature(
79 address _sender , uint32 _open_block_number ,
80 uint32 _payout , bool _cond_transfer ,
81 bytes32 _hash , bytes _signature)
82 internal view
83 returns (address)
84 {
85 bytes32 message_hash = keccak256(
86 keccak256(
87 ’address sender ’,
88 ’uint32 open block number ’,
89 ’uint32 payout ’,
90 ’bool cond_transfer ’,
91 ’bytes32 hash’
92 ),
93 keccak256(
94 _sender ,
95 _open_block_number ,
96 _payout ,
97 _cond_transfer ,
98 _hash
99 )
100 );
101 address signer = ECVerify.ecverify(message_hash ,
_signature);
102 return signer;
103 }
104 function setstate(
105 address _sender , uint32 _open_block_number ,
106 uint32 _payout , bool _cond_transfer ,
107 bytes32 _hash , uint32 _pre_image ,
108 bytes _customer_sig , address _customer)
109 view external
110 {
111 require(msg.sender == monitor);
112 require(flag != Flags.CHEATED);
113 require(_payout != ID[_customer ]. payout);
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114 require(_payout <= ID[_customer ]. deposit);
115 require(keccak256(_pre_image) == _hash);
116
117 address customer_signer = extract_state_signature(
118 _sender ,
119 _open_block_number ,
120 _payout ,
121 _cond_transfer ,
122 _hash ,
123 _customer_sig
124 );
125 require(customer_signer == _customer);
126 profit += _payout;
127 _customer.transfer(ID[_customer ]. deposit - _payout);
128
129 ID[_customer ]. deposit = 0;
130 ID[_customer ]. t_settle = 0;
131 ID[_customer ].flag = Flags.CLOSED;
132 ID[_customer ]. payout = 0;
133 num_customers -= 1;
134
135 Evidence(_customer , _sender , _pre_image ,
_open_block_number);
136 }
137 function triggerdispute(address _sender , uint32
_open_block_number)
138 external
139 {
140 if (ID[msg.sender ].flag == Flags.OK) {
141 ID[msg.sender ].flag = Flags.DISPUTE;
142 ID[msg.sender ]. t_settle = uint32(block.number +
delta_settle);
143 Dispute(msg.sender , _open_block_number , _sender ,
ID[msg.sender ]. t_settle);
144 }
145 }
146 function resolve ()
147 external
148 {
149 if (flag == Flags.CHEATED ||
150 (ID[msg.sender ]. t_settle < block.number &&
151 ID[msg.sender ].flag == Flags.DISPUTE))
152 {
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153 msg.sender.transfer(ID[msg.sender ]. deposit);
154 ID[msg.sender ]. t_settle = 0;
155 ID[msg.sender ]. deposit = 0;
156 ID[msg.sender ].flag = Flags.CLOSED;
157 ID[msg.sender ]. payout = 0;
158 num_customers -= 1;
159 Resolve(msg.sender);
160 }
161 }
162
163 function stopmonitoring ()
164 external
165 {
166 require(msg.sender == monitor);
167 flag = Flags.CLOSED;
168 t_withdraw = uint32(block.number + delta_withdraw);
169 Close(t_withdraw);
170 }
171 function withdraw ()
172 external
173 {
174 require(flag != Flags.CHEATED);
175 require(msg.sender == monitor);
176
177 if (num_customers == 0 &&
178 block.number > t_withdraw &&
179 flag == Flags.CLOSED)
180 {
181 profit += guardian_deposit;
182 guardian_deposit = 0;
183 msg.sender.transfer(profit);
184 profit = 0;
185
186 Withdraw ();
187 }
188 }
189 function extractreceiptsignature(
190 address receiver , address sender ,
191 uint32 open_block_number , uint32 t_start ,
192 uint32 t_expire , bytes32 image ,
193 bytes32 balance_message_hash , bytes monitor_sig)
194 returns(address)
195 {
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196 bytes32 receipt_hash = keccak256(
197 keccak256(
198 ’address customer ’,
199 ’address sender ’,
200 ’uint32 block created ’,
201 ’uint32 start time’,
202 ’uint32 expire time’,
203 ’bytes32 image’,
204 ’bytes32 evidence ’
205 ),
206 keccak256(
207 msg.sender ,
208 sender ,
209 open_block_number ,
210 t_start ,
211 t_expire ,
212 image ,
213 balance_message_hash
214 )
215 );
216
217 address signer = ECVerify.ecverify(receipt_hash ,
monitor_sig);
218 return signer;
219 }
220 function recourse(
221 address sender , uint32 open_block_number ,
222 bytes32 image , uint32 t_start ,
223 uint32 t_expire , bytes32 balance_message_hash ,
224 bytes monitor_sig , uint32 pre_image)
225 external
226 {
227 require(flag != Flags.CHEATED);
228 require(keccak256(pre_image) == image);
229
230 address signer = extractreceiptsignature(
231 msg.sender ,
232 sender ,
233 open_block_number ,
234 t_start ,
235 t_expire ,
236 image ,
237 balance_message_hash ,
44
238 monitor_sig
239 );
240 require(signer == monitor);
241 uint32 block_number;
242 bytes32 evidence;
243
244 (block_number , evidence) = ID[msg.sender ].caddr.
getClosingInfo(sender , msg.sender ,
open_block_number);
245
246 if (
247 open_block_number <= t_start &&
248 block_number < t_expire &&
249 evidence != balance_message_hash)
250 {
251 flag = Flags.CHEATED;
252 RecourseResult(evidence , balance_message_hash ,
true);
253 } else {
254 RecourseResult(evidence , balance_message_hash ,
false);
255 }
256 }
257 }
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